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Safety as a Synergistic Principle in Space Activities 
Diane Howard *
ABSTRACT
The two space anomalies that occurred in October 2014 brought home, 
once again, the fact that space activities are dangerous.  The U.S. Congress 
had acknowledged this fact by characterizing space transportation as 
“inherently risky” in the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 
2004.  While that description does not go as far as to say space activities can 
never be safe or are completely unsafe, it includes the tacit understanding that 
space transportation provides complex and sometimes unique challenges.  
While some of these challenges are engendered by the realities of space 
systems operationally, others arise from the perspective of how much safety 
is legally required and for whom. 
The immediate article attempts to provide an overview of the legal 
underpinnings of space safety and some of the implications arising from 
current space policy.  It will begin with some historical context, proceed to 
describe the current international and domestic legal and policy environment, 
identify some key emerging issues, and end with brief recommendations.  
I. INTRODUCTION
Space activities today include both public and private sector actors 
performing multidimensional operations in variable environments.  Space 
safety, as applied to these activities, has been defined as the protection of 
human life and/or spacecraft during all phases of a space mission, regardless 
of whether this is a “manned” or “unmanned” activity.  The concept of space 
safety covers: (a) all aspects from pre-launch, launch, orbital or sub-orbital 
operations, through re-entry and landing; (b) the protection of ground and 
flight facilities and surrounding population and buildings in proximity to 
launch sites; and (c) the protection of space-based services, infrastructure and 
unmanned satellites.1
But what does this statement really mean? Whose human life? Is this 
limited to the general public, uninvolved with the space activity in any way, 
 *   Assistant Professor, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Gratitude is given to FIU Law and 
Dean Alex Acosta for hosting the symposium, and to the editorial staff of the FIU Law Review for their 
gracious assistance. 
1  TOMMASO SGOBBA, ET AL., SPACE SAFETY REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS xli (Joseph N.
Pelton & Ram S. Jakhu eds., Elsevier 2010). 
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i.e., third parties? Or, should it perhaps include those second parties like crew 
or paid participants/passengers? And where is the sweet spot, protecting 
whomever regulators determine to be included in that catch-all phrase 
“human life,” while also allowing innovation to flourish and business models 
to survive? 
Going slightly deeper, protection from what? Threats can be internal to 
the activity—stemming from systemic or mechanical failure—or external, as 
in a force majeure.  Safety as a social science is relatively new.  While the 
human condition has included mishaps resulting in injury or death as far back 
as is recorded, the incidence of these “accidents” increased significantly in 
the early 1800s during the Industrial Revolution.2 Workers were exposed to 
dangerous machinery and more hazardous working conditions.  The early 
cultural emphasis was placed upon the victim as responsible for his safety, a 
phenomenon known as “blame the victim” which is the underpinning of 
contributory negligence schemes.3 However, simply holding the victim 
responsible did little to discover the root cause of accidents.  The early 1900s 
marked the onset of organized research efforts into accident causation 
resulting in a flurry of published safety information. 
The National Safety Council began its work to promote industry safety 
in 1913.4 Much of the research was funded by insurers and was predicated 
upon two foundational ideas: (1) safety was cost effective, and (2) the cause 
of most accidents was believed to be mental error or the psychology of the 
victim.  This second concept flowed from the standpoint that the accident 
was a form of self-harm, a convenient position for an insurer.5
However, despite the fact that these ideas remained prevalent for the 
next fifty years, accident prevention research provided no useful guidance or 
satisfaction.  No linkage could be found between accident-prone individuals 
and a consistent personality profile thus no long-term improvement on 
accident statistics was achieved.  Ultimately, the work of two researchers in 
the mid-1900s, Gibson and Haddon, shifted the emphasis from a victim’s 
shortcomings to what actually caused the injury.6 This understanding of 
spotting hazards (either from equipment or procedures) before a damaging 
event was the first step toward developing practices that could mitigate injury 
2  Michael Guarnieri, Landmarks in the History of Safety, 23 J. SAFETY RESEARCH 151, 152 (1992). 
3  RON MCKINNON, CHANGING THE WORKPLACE SAFETY CULTURE 18 (CRC Press, 2013). 
4  For a timeline of safety history, see the National Safety Council’s website, available at http://
viewer.zmags.com/publication/89ffce6b#/89ffce6b/1 (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). 
5  Guarnieri, supra note 2, at 152. 
6  William Haddon, Approaches to Prevention of Injuries, in AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
CONFERENCE ON PREVENTION OF DISABLING INJURIES (1983), http://www.iihs.org/frontend/iihs/
documents/masterfiledocs.ashx?id=692 (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). 
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and promote a culture of safety.7
By this time in the mid-1960s, space activities had also resulted in a 
well-publicized fatality.  Apollo 1 was not launched because a cabin fire 
during a rehearsal test killed all three crew members and destroyed the 
Command Module.8 The two shuttle crashes, though caused by different 
physical events, had “common root causal factors” that included 
communications breakdowns, problematic systems engineering and 
integration, lack of accountability, and inconsistent governance.9 The harsh 
reality that conducting space activities came at as steep a price as any other 
activity could not be avoided.  Nor could a space actor circumvent the 
realities flowing from the high profile of the activities, as well as the 
instantaneous transmission of any trouble via globally interconnected 
information channels. 
This last point is brought home by the two earlier referenced anomalies 
in U.S. commercial space transportation in October 2014—by Orbital 
Sciences as it attempted to deliver cargo to the International Space Station, 
and by Virgin Galactic as it performed a test flight under an experimental 
permit.10 The latter resulted in both a fatality and a serious bodily injury.11
Almost immediately, the entire space sector was abuzz with the news and 
wondering what the ramifications could be.  What kind of governance 
response was legally required? What policies would any response implicate? 
And, how would a U.S. position impact space activities elsewhere, if at all? 
II. SPACE SAFETY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Although there is no specific treaty mandate regarding safety, both the 
Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention implicate, by necessity, safe 
activities of a launching State.12  Launching States are those that either launch 
7  Trevor Kletz, The History of Process Safety, 25 J. LOSS PREVENTION IN THE PROCESS
INDUSTRIES 763, 764 (2012). 
8 Photos of the Apollo 1 Fire: NASA’s First Disaster, SPACE.COM (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.
space.com/10674-apollo-1-fire-nasa-disaster.html.
9  David Jones et al., Self Evaluation Tool: Key Lessons Learned from the Columbia Shuttle 
Disaster (adapted to the process industries), AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS (2005),
available at http://www.aiche.org/ccps/topics/elements-process-safety/commitment-process-safety/
process-safety-culture/building-safety-culture-tool-kit/process-safety-culture/key-lessons-columbia-
disaster; Bryan O’Connor, Organizational and Cultural Lessons Learned from Challenger and Columbia,
NASA.GOV, http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/396770main_mf18_oconnor.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). 
10 NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility Completes Initial Assessment After Orbital Launch Mishap,
NASA.GOV (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.nasa.gov/press/2014/october/nasa-s-wallops-flight-facility-
completes-initial-assessment-after-orbital-launch/#.VM51LF7F-lI (last visted Feb. 1, 2015); Tariq Malik, 
Virgin Galactic SpaceShip Two Crash: Full Coverage and Investigation, SPACE.COM (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.space.com/27629-virgin-galactic-spaceshiptwo-crash-full-coverage.html.
11 Id.
12  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
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or procure the launch, or from whose territory or facility a space object is 
launched.13 The launching State is responsible in perpetuity for damage from 
its space object.14
Similarly, both Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, along with the 
Registration Convention itself, have been viewed as implicit legal links to 
assigning responsibility for safe space activities.15  This responsibility is 
framed in terms of retained jurisdiction and control by the State upon whose 
registry a space object is launched.  The Outer Space Treaty Article VI 
provides further legal basis for a safety requirement by putting the onus on 
the State granting the license to authorize, or endorse the space activities of 
its nationals, and then to continually monitor and supervise.16
International obligations to conduct space activities safely are also 
implicit in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, requiring avoidance of 
harmful interference with activities in the peaceful use and exploration of 
outer space.17  This obligates States to ensure that operators perform safely, 
at least with sufficient due diligence expended to reasonably avoid actions 
that will have adverse effect on the activities of other State parties.18
The first set of principles and guidelines pertinent to space that set forth 
an express safety obligation is the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of 
Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space.19  The Preamble recognizes that 
thorough safety assessment, including probabilistic risk analysis, is the 
necessary basis for reducing risk to the public from the use of nuclear power 
sources. Principle 3 delineates guidelines and criteria for safe use while 
Principle 4 describes the general elements of safety assessment and obligates 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, U.N.T.S. 205 
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
13 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, at art. VII; see also Liability Convention, supra note 12, 
at art. I (c). 
14  Liability Convention, supra note 12, at art. I. 
15  Ram S. Jakhu & Yaw O. T. Nyampong, Are the Current International Space Treaties Sufficient 
to Regulate Space Safety, and Establish Responsibility and Liability?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2D IAASS
CONFERENCE: SPACE SAFETY IN A GLOBAL WORLD (May 14, 2007). 
16  “The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to 
the Treaty.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, at art. VI. 
17  Article IX directs States Parties to conduct their space activities with due regard to the 
corresponding interests of all others, to avoid harmful contamination of the Moon and other celestial 
bodies and adverse changes to Earth’s environment, and a duty to consult if there is some indication of 
harmful interference with activities of other parties.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, at art. IX. 
18  For a wonderful analysis of the obligations found in Article IX, see Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C
and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space 
Treaty 34 J. Space L. 321, 332-40 (2008) [hereinafter Mineiro IV]. 
19  Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, G. A. Res. 47/68, U.
N. DOC. A/RES/47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992). 
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launching states to make public the results of the safety assessment prior to 
launch as per Article XI of the OST. Safety assessment and risk analysis 
continue to play the most crucial role in all aspects of safe space activities.20
The safety assessment is to cover all “relevant phases of the mission” 
including the launch.21
It has been inferred that the space treaties create a legal obligation for 
States to adopt and implement national space legislation, including safety 
standards and procedures.22  As with other international treaties, these treaties 
are subject to various national treaty application systems.23  Safety is an 
intrinsic component of most authorizing processes.24
III. SAFETY AS A POLICY DRIVER
What role does safety play in national space laws?  Examination of the 
domestic space laws of nineteen different jurisdictions for common elements 
and policy drivers reveals the significance of safety as both an element of 
domestic space law and as a policy driver underpinning those laws.25
Analysis showed that safety was the element most prevalently found in 
20 Id. principle 4(1). 
21 Id.
22  Jakhu & Nyampong, supra note 15, at 5. 
23  John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J.
INT’L L. 310 (1992). Jackson offers an incisive analysis of the pros and cons of self-executing or direct 
application treaties, concluding that there are sound policy reasons to avoid direct application treaties, 
without more, where there are democratic institutions in place to avoid direct application in tandem with 
higher status for treaty norms than for later in time statutory law.  Id. at 313.  Countries permitting self-
executing treaties allow the treaty to take a statute-like role in the domestic legal system without an act of 
transformation.  Id. at 310.  “Self-executing treaties are binding domestic law upon ratification whereas 
non-self-executing treaties require implementing legislation to become effective.” Benjamin Perlman, 
Grounding U.S. Commercial Space Regulation in the Constitution, 100 GEO. L.J. 929, 952 (Mar. 2012). 
These States are considered monist, primarily because there is no distinction between the legal system as 
applied to public bodies and the system that applies to private citizens.  Fiona De Londras, Dualism,
Domestic Courts, and the Rule of International Law, in IUS GENTIUM: THE RULE OF LAW IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 221, (Mortimer Sellers and Teadusz Tomaszewski, eds., Apr. 16, 2009) (on 
file with University College Dublin); John Laws, Monism and Dualism, LA REVUE ADMINISTRATIVE 18-
22, 18 (Presses Universitaires de France: 53e Ann?e, No. 2, 2000).  Monist States allow direct application 
of treaties.  States can be dualist, requiring an act of transformation for a treaty to become effective. This 
is usually a government action by the State and is done in terms of incorporating the treaty norm into 
domestic law, perhaps via a statute that utilizes some or all of the treaty language.  Jackson, supra note 23 
at 315.  The implementing statute may use different language and clarify or elaborate upon that found in 
the treaty; the domestic law is the transformatory act. 
24  Other than the listed jurisdictions that dealt with government-only activities, all others in the 
table included safety as a driver of regulation. 
25  Diane Howard, The Emergence of an Effective National and International Spaceport Regime of 
Law (Nov. 2014) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, McGill University) (on file with McGill Library, 
McGill University).  The countries included in the study were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, South Korea, 
Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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domestic space law (seventy-one percent of the jurisdictions included).26
More importantly, the value on safety is of vital importance in most systems; 
safety was included as a value in seventy-five percent of the space laws and 
policies examined, second only to the value placed upon international 
obligations and cooperation.27  However, safety can be assessed using 
different methodology and standards in different jurisdictions, an issue to be 
explored infra.
IV. SAFETY IN U.S. DOMESTIC SPACE LAW
The safety component of a U.S. license or permit fulfills the 
international obligations found in Articles VI, VII, VIII, and IX of the Outer 
Space Treaty.28  Safety assessments are necessary to obtain either a spaceport, 
launch, or launch operator license, or an experimental permit. 29  The U.S. 
Congress, through the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (CSLA), 
directs the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) to regulate 
private sector launches, reentries, and related services (this includes 
spaceport operations) “only to the extent necessary . . . to ensure compliance 
with the international obligations of the United States and to protect the 
public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign 
policy interests of the United States.”30
Safety assessment is part of the U.S. authorizing process.31  The 
requirements to receive a license include meeting the AST’s parameters of 
acceptable or tolerable risk.32  Paul Wilde, Flight Safety Analysis Team Lead 
at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), correctly asserts that serious 
injury and/or death are not acceptable outcomes and that no U.S. agency 
would deem them routine or permissible.33  Rather, since it is virtually 
impossible to completely eliminate all risk, he says that the term “tolerable 
26 Id. at 54. 
27 Id. at 82. 
28  14 C.F.R. §§ 420 et seq.; see also J. Randall Repcheck, Safety and Promotion in the Federal 
Aviation Administration—Enabling Safe and Successful Commercial Space Transportation, in
PROCEEDINGS FOURTH IAASS CONFERENCE (May 2010) [hereinafter Repcheck I]. 
29  51 U.S.C. § 50901(a)(7) (2012). 
30 Id.
31  J. Randall Repcheck, FAA’s Implementation of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act 
of 2004—the Experimental Permit, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST IAASS CONFERENCE, SPACE SAFETY,
A NEW BEGINNING (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter, Repcheck II].  Although the paper describes a different aspect 
of the CSLAA of 2004, the experimental permit, than that with which we are here concerned, the FAA’s 
role in quantifying risk levels is the same. 
32 Id.  The paper describes the experimental permit rather than license but the FAA’s role in 
quantifying risk levels is the same. 
33  Paul Wildeet al., Public Safety Standards for the Launch and Entry of Spacecraft, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST IAASS CONFERENCE, SPACE SAFETY, A NEW BEGINNING (ESA SP-599, 
Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Wilde I]. 
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risk” is a more correct description of the risks that would pass muster in an 
oversight of launch safety.34
FAA AST oversight is imposed in the form of quantitative risk analyses 
regarding Expected Casualty rates to third parties.35  These quantitative 
standards only apply to the safety of the uninvolved public.As of this writing, 
the FAA mandates no acceptable levels of risk for spaceflight participants or 
passengers and no qualitative requirements for the crew. 
Table 1: FAA AST AC 437.55-1 Risk Matrix 
The FAA makes safety approval determinations related to commercial 
spaceflight based upon performance-based criteria, which it applies in 
hierarchical order, as seen in Table 1.36  It uses these criteria to assess the 
effect on the health and safety of the uninvolved public. In order, they are: 
(1) FAA or other appropriate Federal regulations; (2) government-developed 
or adopted standards; (3) industry consensus performance-based criteria or 
standard; and (4) applicant-developed criteria.37  The last category allows 
manufacturers to define their own performance standards, and could carry 
some potential risk or conflict of interest.38  In August, 2014, the FAA 
published its Recommended Practices for Human Spaceflight Occupant 
Safety, which does not yet rise to the level of adopted standards (the second 
criterion), but does invite industry to develop consensus criteria (the third) 
based upon a sharing of applicant-developed criteria (the fourth).39
34 Id.
35  Andy Quinn, Acceptable Levels of Safety for the Commercial Space Flight Industry, IAC-12-
D6.1.2, (Oct. 2012) (presented at the 63rd International Astronautical Congress in Naples, Italy), at 3 
[hereinafter Quinn I]. 
36  14 C.F.R. § 420.19 (2012). 
37 Id.
38  Mark Flores, Blast Off?—Strict Liability’s Potential Role in the Development of the Commercial 
Space Market, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 30 (2010). 
39  FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT
OCCUPANT SAFETY Version 1.0 (Aug. 27, 2014), at 1. 
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Currently, the FAA uses a probability of risk of 10-6 for Expected 
Casualty for third parties on the ground.40  The U.S. focuses upon the 
protection of the uninvolved public’s persons and property, not the safety of 
those on board.41  This limit represents that which has been statistically 
determined to ensure as high a level of public safety as practicable. However, 
some space safety experts in other jurisdictions consider this metric 
significantly lower than that deemed appropriate, preferring instead to use a 
factor of 10-4 without limitation to third parties.42
The limit is also applied differently for Reusable Launch Vehicles 
(RLVs) and Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVS). A single limit of 30 E-6
Ec (expected casualty) applies to the launch/reentry of an RLV or RV (reentry 
vehicle) while with an ELV, separate Ec limits of 30 E-6 pertain to inert and 
explosive debris, toxic materials, and distant focusing of blast overpressure 
risks.43
The quality risk assessment (QRA) is integral to achieving the AST’s 
overarching policy goal of public safety, and is used to identify and 
characterize risks using the risk-informed model used by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in making its regulatory decisions.44  The 
risks and tolerable limits are identified to achieve specific goals.  Wilde 
suggests that these goals should be: (1) ensuring public safety and financial 
responsibility; (2) understanding risk drivers and identifying prudent risk 
reduction measures; (3) understanding sources of uncertainty and means to 
reduce same; (4) helping to “fully inform” the decision-maker, ostensibly the 
AST, using the best available data and methods; and (5) providing 
transparency to facilitate commercial space transportation in an effort to 
create some objective certainty.45
The above-listed goals accord with the dual mandate given to the FAA 
AST, first in the Commercial Space Launch Act and continued in all of its 
40  App’x C to Part 420—Risk Analysis, 14 C.F.R. § 420 (2006). 
41  Quinn I, supra note 35, at 1. 
42 Id.
43  Wilde I, supra note 33, at 6. 
44 Id. at 2.   Cf. The NRC Risk Assessment Paradigm, EPA.GOV, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ttn/atw/toxsource/paradigm.html (last visited May 8, 2012).  The risk to all members of the public, 
excluding those on waterborne vessels and aircraft, cannot exceed 3 x10-6 casualties for each of named 
hazard while the risk to an individual member cannot exceed 1 x 10-6. 14 C.F.R. § 417.107(b)(1) (2012). 
14 C.F.R. § 417 sets forth the parameters of a safe launch.  Undoubtedly, the exception for occupants of 
aircraft and vessels is related to the inherent risks associated with those activities. 
45  Wilde I, supra note 33, at 2-3.  Fully informing becomes quite important in the U.S. as a key 
test under the Federal Tort Claims Act asks whether the decision-making official was fully advised and 
informed of risks prior to making the subject decision.  If not, liability can attach to the USG or its officials. 
The underlying policy is to prohibit the courts from second-guessing well-informed, authorized officials 
when determining acceptable operational risk. 
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progeny.46  The agency must protect the public’s safety (and property) while 
it also encourages, facilitates and promotes U.S. commercial space 
transportation.47  To this end, when enacting the CSLAA, Congress restricted 
the FAA’s ability to promulgate regulations dealing with the health and 
safety of crew and spaceflight participants.  The intention was to provide a 
“learning period” to newcomers to the space transportation industry without 
overly burdening the development of innovative technologies with premature 
regulation.48 In this way, both prongs of the mandate could be realized. 
Originally, this period was to last eight years.  The thought was that this 
would give the industry time to begin operations and to accrue a bank of data 
from which tailored safety regulations could flow.49  However, the timeline 
for operations was longer than expected.  Despite the press and public’s 
hunger for commercial operations to commence, many operators are still in 
experimental permit phase.  Hence, Congress extended the period several 
times. It now expires in October 2015. 
The learning period was not without caveats.  The CSLAA allowed the 
FAA to enact regulations prior to the expiration of the period if a flight 
resulted in a fatality or serious injury or in an incident that likely could.  The 
Orbital crash, while unfortunate, did not result in fatality or serious bodily 
injury.50  Nor did the company’s investigation reveal conditions that likely 
would have.  The triggering events that could set in motion FAA regulatory 
action were not present. 
But the Virgin Galactic anomaly was another story entirely.  The co-
pilot died. The other pilot survived but was grievously injured.  For the first 
time, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) took the lead on the 
investigation,51 finally exercising jurisdiction as per a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the FAA, the NTSB, and the U.S. Air Force that had 
46  Commercial Space Launch Act, PUB. LAW 98-575 §3 (Oct. 30, 1984). 
47  51 U.S.C. §§ 50903 (b), (c) (2015). 
48  While many refer to this part of the CSLAA as a moratorium on safety regulation, that statement 
is not accurate. Jeff Foust, Industry, FAA at Odds over Extension of ‘Learning Period’ for Commercial 
Spaceflight Safety Regulations, SPACE POLITICS (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.spacepolitics.
com/2014/02/06/industry-faa-at-odds-over-extension-of-learning-period-for-commercial-spaceflight-
safety-regulations/.
49  Actually, Dr. Nield, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, FAA, 
testified in 2014 that he believed the present to be the time to begin thinking about safety regulations for 
crew and participants as we now have 50+ years of NASA experience from which to draw information. 
Statement of Dr. George C. Nield, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation of the 
Federal Aviation Administration, before the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 
Subcommittee on Space, on necessary updates to the Commercial Space Launch Act, Feb. 4, 2014, 
available at http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/nield1.pdf. 
50 Orbital-led Team to Investigate Antares Rocket Explosion, DAILY PRESS (Nov. 5, 2014), http:/
/www.dailypress.com/news/science/dp-nws-orbital-accident-board-20141105-story.html.
51 NTSB Investigates Virgin Galactic Test Flight Crash, NTSB.GOV, available at http://www.ntsb.
gov/investigations/Pages/2014_Virgin_Galactic.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
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been in place for ten years.52  The commercial spaceflight industry was 
rocked.  Two tragedies struck within days of one another. The sadness was 
heartfelt.
Once emotion began to settle, the questions began. How would the FAA 
respond?  What, precisely, did the language of the CSLAA require?  How 
would this impact the industry as a whole? 
The actual text of the law limits safety regulations to “restricting or 
prohibiting design features or operating practices that have resulted in a 
serious or fatal injury to crew or space flight participants during a licensed or 
permitted commercial human space flight.”53  This means that any resulting 
regulation would have to be narrowly tailored to address only those design 
features and operating practices that were directly implicated in causation of 
the death and/or injury.  The NTSB concluded its investigation in late July 
2015, finding probable cause in the company’s (Scaled Composites) “failure 
to consider and protect against the possibility that a single human error could 
result in a catastrophic hazard” to the vehicle.54  While the NTSB made eight 
recommendations to the FAA and two to the commercial spaceflight industry 
via the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, these deal primarily with human 
factors and the timing of pre-permit and pre-license consultations.55  The 
ramifications for the industry will likely not be broad or onerous. 
Interestingly, the two anomalies occurred a mere two months after the 
AST presented its Recommended Practices for Human Space Flight 
Occupant Safety.  When announcing the documents availability at an 
advisory committee meeting in September, Dr. Nield explained that this was 
a starting point in the long and arduous rule-making process and urged 
industry to enter the discourse by compiling consensus industry standards.56
Best practices and standards are used with increasing frequency, 
particularly in technological sectors, such as aerospace, where more codified 
law is either not the goal or believed to be premature.57  The reliance on 
52   MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, AND FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION REGARDING SPACE
LAUNCH ACCIDENTS, (2004), available at https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/
ast/media/mou_space_launch_accidents.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
53  51 U.S.C. § 50905(2)(C) (2012). 
54 Aerospace Accident Report: In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites 
SpaceShipTwo, N339SS Near Koehn Dry Lake, California, October 31, 2014 (adopted July 28, 2015), 
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1502.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2015), 69-71. 
55 Id.
56  Prior to agency rule-making action, each proposed requirement must be justified, subject to 
economic analysis, and put before the public for comment. Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 
(Oct. 4, 1993). 
57  Daniel P. Murray & Andre Weil, The FAA’s Approach to Quality Assurance in the Flight Safety 
Analysis of Launch and Reentry Vehicles, in PROCEEDINGS FOURTH IAASS CONFERENCE, MAKING
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standards and best practices in the absence of more positive law has been 
envisaged as symptomatic of emerging norms in either nascent or fast-
changing areas of regulation.58
Presently, there are a number of space safety standards-developing 
initiatives in various stages of work.  The Commercial Space Transportation 
Advisory Group (COMSTAC) is a group advising the FAA “on all matters 
relating to U.S. commercial space transportation industry activities,” with 
support from the Office of Commercial Space Transportation.59  COMSTAC 
itself is comprised of twenty-five representatives from industry and 
academia, serving for a two-year renewable term.  The FAA is authorized to 
create working groups within COMSTAC.  The most recent of these is the 
Standards Working Group, tasked to identify and analyze existing industry 
standards and to develop and prioritize a list.60  Not a year before, the 
Commercial Spaceflight Federation, a consortium of U.S. member 
organizations working together for the common goal of democratized 
commercial human spaceflight, had approved the first U.S. industry standard 
drafted by its Technical Standards Committee.61
Also ongoing are international efforts.  For instance, the Science and 
Technical Subcommittee (STSC) of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) established a Working Group 
on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTSSA) in 2011. 
The Terms of Reference62 direct the Working Group to first consider current 
practices and standards in use by stakeholders in Member States, then 
compile a report and set of proposed practices and procedures, technical 
standards and policies, and, finally, to produce a set of voluntary 
recommended guidelines in hopes that this will reduce the collective risk of 
space activities.63  Participation at the Working Group level is limited to State 
delegations; Expert Groups were open to participation from experts 
nominated by delegations and invited non-governmental and 
SAFETY MATTER (May 2010). 
58  Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52-
4 INT’L ORG. 887, 895 (1998).
59  COMSTAC Charter, U.S. DEP’T. TRANS. Order 1110.124H (Nov. 16, 2012). 
60 Office of Commercial Space Transportation, COMSTAC Membership, FAA.GOV, (Mar. 25, 
2015, 4:51:26 PM), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/advisory_
committee/membership/.
61  ANNUAL REPORT 2013, COMMERCIAL SPACEFLIGHT FEDERATION, at 4. This first standard deals 
with propellant handling; apparently three more are in process. 
62  “Terms of reference” is defined as “the specific limits of responsibility that determine the 
activities of an investigating body, etc.” Terms of Reference, COLLINS ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.
collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/terms-of-reference (last visited May 25, 2015).  
63 Terms of Reference and Methods of Work of the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability 
of Outer Space Activities of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, A/AC.105/C.1/L.307 (Jan. 24, 
2011), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c1/AC105_C1_L307E.pdf. 
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intergovernmental organizations with permanent observer status.64
The International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety 
(IAASS) is an international network/professional organization, established in 
2004 in the Netherlands and “dedicated to furthering international 
cooperation and scientific advancement in the field of space systems 
safety.”65  In 2011, the IAASS formed a Technical Committee (TC) to tackle 
the safety issues relevant to the suborbital industry.66 The TC’s membership 
included individuals representing regulatory authorities, space agencies, 
private industry, academia, and IAASS members with expertise. Its goal was 
to identify best practices and standards for technical issues pertaining to 
safety and operations.67  The TC drafted guidelines and presented these with 
a report in Germany in October 2014.68
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a non-
governmental organization (NGO) network of national standards institutes in 
163 countries with a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland.  There are 
both state and non-state elements of the ISO.  Member institutes, one per 
country, are often part of the government structure where located, or are 
mandated by that government; however, other member institutes were set up 
by networks of industry associations.69  The requirement is that the ISO 
member be the organization most representative of standardization in the 
home country.70  The ISO develops far more than space standards but is active 
in that area. 
Lastly, another international initiative recognizing both the integral 
importance of safety in space activities and the role that technical standards 
play is the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.71  This 
instrument is still in draft form and key points continue to be negotiated. 
64 Id. at ¶¶ 18, 24. The author served as a U.S. subject matter expert and private sector advisor for 
Expert Group D: “Regulatory Issues” as a part of this initiative, and continues to advise the U.S. delegation 
as the Working Group seeks consensus on the guidelines and their format. 
65 About IAASS, IAASS.ORG, http://www.iaass.org/About.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) http://
www.iaass.org/About.aspx; Simonetta Di Pippo et al., Pursuing the Advancement of Space Safety: the Case 
of ISSF & IAASS, IAC-12-D5.1.5, at 2, Presented at IAC Naples, Italy (Oct. 2012). 
66  Andy Quinn et al., New Suborbital Safety Technical Committee for the IAASS, in PROCEEDINGS
5TH IAASS CONFERENCE, A SAFER SPACE FOR A SAFER WORLD, (Oct. 17-19, 2011) (ESA SP-699, Jan. 
2012).  The author serves as the legal lead for the TC. 
67 Ibid.
68 Guidelines for the Safe Regulation, Design and Operation of Suborbital Vehicles, IAASS
SUBORBITAL SAFETY TECHNICAL COMMITTEE MANUAL (May 2014), update presented at the 7th IAASS 
Conference, SPACE SAFETY IS NO ACCIDENT (Oct. 2014, Germany). 
69 About ISO, ISO.ORG, http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
70 ISO Code of Ethics, ISO.ORG, http://www.iso.org/iso/codeethics_2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 
2010).
71  DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES (Mar. 31, 2014), 
available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/space_code_conduct_
draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf.
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Originally proposed by the European Union and meeting with some 
procedural resistance at U.N. COPUOS in 2012, the latest draft was approved 
in March 2014.72  Ninety-five Member States have participated in the 
consultative process to date.73  The Code of Conduct is a soft-law instrument. 
While these organizations all represent sincere efforts to address issues 
pertinent to space safety with pragmatic methodology, little has been 
accomplished to coordinate efforts. 
V. DISPARATE METRICS AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES
Safety is a shared driver of regulation, both as a social value underlying 
policy and a goal.  The goal of safety may not be universal but it is widely 
acknowledged in national legislation and implicit in space treaties.  However, 
disparate approaches in assessment indicate differences in social values 
(uninvolved public safety valued over participants) and may challenge 
interoperability of regulatory systems. 
Disparate safety metrics create a hurdle to performing international 
activities between transportation regimes.  Different thresholds for 
acceptable risk mean that what is considered safe and therefore legal or 
licensable in one jurisdiction is not in another.  This is an issue even now, 
before commercial transportation is a regularly performed activity between 
jurisdictions.  For instance, when presented with draft guidelines proposed 
by the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety in May 
2014, COMSTAC members vociferously balked at the use of the 10-4 metric, 
calling it arbitrary and onerous.74  The U.K. CAA is exploring the possible 
effects this lack of alignment might have upon its plans for future space 
transportation.75  Curaçao is negotiating a proposed spaceport that will fly 
XCor vehicles on wet lease.76  XCor is a U.S. company, subject to U.S. 
licensing requirements. Curaçao is an autonomous country within the 
72 Code of Conduct for Space Activities, EUROPEAN UNION, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/
non-proliferation-and-disarmament/outer-space-activities/index_en.htm (last visited Sept 6, 2015). 
73 Id. Consultations continue on the international level.  At the most recent U.N. COPUOS plenary 
meeting in June, 2015, the EU External Action office hosted an informal meeting in the margins.  Another 
meeting was held at the U.N. in New York late July, 2015, with the assistance of the U.N. Disarmament 
office but hosted by the External Action office, available at http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/events/
code-of-conduct-negotiations-july-2015-new-york (last visited Sept. 6, 2015).  The author attended the 
meeting in June. 
74  Jeff Foust, International Suborbital Safety Proposal Gets Cold Shoulder in U.S., SPACE NEWS
(May 19, 2014), http://spacenews.com/40615international-suborbital-safety-proposal-gets-cold-shoulder-
in-us/.
75  U.K. GOVERNMENT REVIEW OF COMMERCIAL SPACEPLANE CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS:
TECHNICAL REPORT 59 (July 2014). 
76 Space Experience Curaçao Announces Wet Lease of XCOR’s Lynx Suborbital Spacecraft,
XCOR, available at http://xcor.com/press/2010/10-10-05_Space_Experience_Curacao_announces_wet_
lease_of_lynx.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
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Kingdom of the Netherlands, a European country.  How this will resolve is 
still unclear. 
The U.S. FAA’s Wilde has written extensively on improving methods 
of assessment.77  He recommends four safety goals to guide decision-making 
regarding acceptable, or tolerable, risk and recommends quantitative safety 
objectives, mostly in the context of risk limits for launch and reentry 
activities.  The first of these goals sets the chances for an individual member 
of the general public, uninvolved with the launch activity, at less than one 
percent of the average annual individual risk of becoming a casualty due to 
any other type of transportation accident for the uninvolved general public in 
the U.S.78  The second goal limits exposure of the uninvolved public to 
casualty risks greater than risks associated with other comparable involuntary 
activities, which are defined as manmade activities that are: (1) subject to 
government regulation or control by government agency, (2) of vital interest 
to the U.S. as launching state, and (3) involuntarily expose the public to risk 
of serious injury, if not more.79
The third goal contemplates the risk for those individuals that 
voluntarily involve themselves with a risky activity but who are uninvolved 
with the commercial space activity per se (as in an aircraft or ship passenger) 
and states that this risk must be proportional to the background risk associated 
with that voluntary activity.80  Lastly, the chances of an accident resulting in 
five or more casualties must be thoroughly mitigated.81
From these objectives, Wilde posits policy questions regarding the 
difference in treatment for RLVs, asking whether there should be separate 
risk limits for each phase of flight, launch and reentry, instead of treating the 
77 See Wilde I, supra note 33; Paul D. Wilde, Public Risk Criteria and Rationale for Commercial 
Launch and Reentry, in PROCEEDINGS 5TH IAASS CONFERENCE, A SAFER SPACE FOR A SAFER WORLD
(Oct. 2011); Paul Wilde & Jim Duffy, How Many Significant Figures are Useful for Public Risk 
Estimates?, in PROCEEDINGS 6TH IAASS CONFERENCE, SAFETY IS NOT AN OPTION (21-23 May, 2013) 
(ESA SP-715, Sept. 2013); Paul Wilde, et. al., Probability of Failure Analysis Standards and Guidelines 
for Expendable Launch Vehicles, in PROCEEDINGS 6TH IAASS CONFERENCE, SAFETY IS NOT AN OPTION
(21-23 May 2013) (ESA SP-715, Sept. 2013). 
78  Wilde I, supra note 33; see also Joram Verstraeten & Alfred Roelen, Safety Risk Management 
for the Emerging Commercial Suborbital Space Industry, in PROCEEDINGS 6TH IAASS CONFERENCE,
SAFETY IS NOT AN OPTION (21-23 May 2013) (ESA SP-715, Sept. 2013); Michael Brett, Risk Hazard 
Analysis for Commercial Spaceflight Activities Using Range Safety Template Toolkit, IAC-11-D6.1.2, in
62ND INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL CONGRESS (Oct. 2011). 
79  This definition of comparable involuntary activities is derived from the Common Risk Criteria 
Standards for National Test Ranges, Standard 321-10 at 2-2, put out by the Range Commanders Council 
(Dec. 2010). 
80  Wilde I, supra note 33, at 7. Cf. Advisory Circular 431.35-1 US DOT FAA, Expected Casualty 
Calculations for Commercial Space Launch and Reentry Missions (Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://
www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/licenses_permits/media/Ac4311fn.pdf (last 
visited May 9, 2012). 
81  Wilde I, supra note 33, at 7. 
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entire event with one collective limit, and whether separate risk limits should 
be set for each source of hazard or the total risk of all hazards combined. 
Significantly, he asks whether the collective risk limit should include those 
people in the vehicle or only those on the ground.  This is the place where 
there is divergence between the method proposed by European experts (and 
the current incarnation of the IAASS Suborbital Guidelines), who would 
include them, and the now operative U.S. expected casualty calculations, 
which do not.  If the latter, then a separate method would be necessary to 
calculate and control the risks to people in the vehicle. 
The risk assessments now utilized by the FAA are not completely 
incompatible with the methodology suggested by the IAASS and the 
European experts.  Both could be used simultaneously.  One is simply dealing 
with first and second parties, while the other deals with third parties.  Further 
divergence occurs as to which metrics are considered acceptable.  Despite 
these variables, the risk assessments are stated in the same terms (numerical), 
apples to apples, and do not represent an insurmountable hurdle. 
VI. EMERGING AND ONGOING ISSUES IN SPACE SAFETY
The different initiatives described herein concern themselves with 
various aspects of space safety, ranging from the handling of propellants to 
standardized formats for the sharing of information pertaining to space 
weather events.  A number of key issues have emerged and continue to 
dominate space safety discourse at all levels.  These issues include space 
situational awareness from the standpoint of data sharing to avoid collision, 
debris mitigation and possibly remediation, coordination of space traffic 
through national air spaces and ongoing space traffic management once 
beyond air space.  Volumes have been written about some of these issues, 
debris mitigation chief among them.  Space traffic coordination and 
management is gaining momentum as commercial space transportation 
operations move from the permit phase to licensed operations in the U.S., 
and, as more jurisdictions around the globe contemplate commercial 
operations and spaceports, interoperability gains in priority. Space safety is 
the heart of all of these. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Sometimes great ideas are lost in translation.  One party can view an 
action as very obviously for the greater good and another will see it quite 
differently.  While this diversity of viewpoint and independent opinion can 
be the antidote to groupthink,82 it can also frustrate efforts toward coalition. 
82  Sharon Allen, The Death of Groupthink, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Feb. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-02-05/the-death-of-groupthinkbusinessweek-business-
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This appears to be the case regarding the impasse between U.S. operators and 
their European counterparts regarding safety standards.  However, impasse 
does not necessarily equate with failure; it can simply mean delay. 
All space stakeholders, whether they function in industry, academia, in 
any governmental capacity, or as regulators, prioritize safety in space 
activities.  It is a shared value. While the details remain to be resolved, an 
acknowledgement of agreement on the priority of these issues is a necessary 
first step.  The IAASS effort to create guidelines from applicant-developed 
criteria was simply an early initiative to begin the process of creating industry 
consensus standards.  The U.S. operators, while invited to participate, chose 
not to. Perhaps this was a misunderstanding.  Perhaps it was a timing issue. 
The fact remains that all the current initiatives described in the immediate 
article are voluntary, non-binding, efforts to identify existing protocols that 
can make space activities safer for human life.  Consensus takes time.  But, 
the ultimate pay-off is the satisfaction that all participants in building that 
consensus have in knowing that they contributed to a greater good. 
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